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Abstract 
 
According to Gurwitsch, the body is at least at the margin of 
consciousness. If all components of the field of consciousness 
were experienced as equally salient, we would indeed not be able 
to think and behave appropriately. Though the body may become 
the focus of our conscious field when we are introspectively 
aware of it, it remains most of the time only at the background of 
consciousness. However, we may wonder if bodily states do 
really need to be conscious, even at the margin, or cannot be 
simply non-conscious. Action control requires permanent 
proprioceptive and visual feedback about the state and the 
position of our body parts. Experimental data show that action 
monitoring operates at a nonconscious level and we may 
similarly suggest that we have a continuous unconscious access 
to bodily information. In this chapter, I thus intend to describe 
the various levels of body representations with the help of 
Gurwitsch‘s distinction. I will investigate the properties and the 
function of each of these levels. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
    We spend the first year of our lives in self-exploration of our body. By 
looking at the mirror, playing with our limbs, touching our face and 
imitating others, we construct fine-tuned body representations that will 
allow us to recognize ourselves, to move, and to interact with the world 
(Rochat, 1998). After this early calibration, it seems that we no longer need 
to pay attention to our body, which has become a well-known tool that we 
frequently use without even thinking of it. The priority is given to the 
external world. Yet, this marginal body is not negligible for all that. Despite 
its peripheral status, it is still mentally represented, and even consciously. In 
this essay, I provide two compatible interpretations of the notion of marginal 
body: as bodily experiences in the background of consciousness and as 
unconscious sensorimotor schemata. With the help of Aron Gurwitsch‘s 
distinction (1964, 1985) and some clarifications of his main hypotheses, I 
intend to sketch the different levels of body representations.  
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I. The Visible and the Invisible Body 
 
     This bodily presence is of a highly paradoxical 
nature. While in one sense the body is the most 
abiding and inescapable presence in our lives, it is 
also characterized by its absence. That is, one‘s 
own body is rarely the thematic object of 
experience. (Leder, 1990: 1) 
 
How can the most permanent and preponderant object in our life be also 
the most elusive one? The presence-absence of the body can be understood 
at two different levels: the sensory one (which bodily information I receive) 
and the phenomenological one (what I feel).
1
 At the sensory level, we 
continuously receive a flow of information about our own body through 
external and inner perceptions. Not only can we see or touch it, but we also 
have several inner receptors that convey sensory data about joint position, 
muscle stretching, pain, temperature, posture, balance, and nutrition. Unlike 
external perception, the inner sensory flow never stops and cannot be 
voluntarily controlled: you can close your eyes, but you cannot prevent the 
sense of balance. Thus, an important amount of information is always 
available, whether we want it or not, whether we pay attention to it or not. 
This ―on line‖ visual and proprioceptive feedback allows us to plan, initiate, 
and control our actions. At this basic level, the body is always present in all 
its details. However, it does not seem that this precision is preserved at the 
phenomenological level. I will start with a very general statement: except in 
sensory deprivation state, we never feel disembodied and we can even feel 
as if a body part still exists when it has been amputated in the phenomenon 
of phantom limb (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998). One‘s own body is 
characterized by its permanency and constitutes a point of reference for the 
dynamic world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945) and for the dynamic stream of 
consciousness (James, 1890). Each perceived object is encoded into an 
egocentric frame of reference centered on the body (Gurwitsch, 1985; 
Jeannerod, 1997). Moreover, according to William James, the bodily 
presence characterized by the ―feeling of warmth and intimacy‖ would 
constitute the inner nucleus of the Self, that is, the intrinsic liaison between 
experiences. Thus, James suggested that the stream of thinking is in fact a 
stream of breathing. So, ―the feeling of the same old body always there‖ 
(James, 1890: 242) would anchor both the external and the inner world.  
Yet, most of the time this feeling is only in the background of 
consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty (1964) said, the body is ―invisible‖: I do 
not see my eyes, I see the object seen by my eyes. It is true that I receive a 
large amount of information about the position of my eyes. Nonetheless, the 
focus of my attention is generally the external world rather than the medium 
                                                 
1 Similarly, Gallagher (2003) draws a distinction between proprioceptive information 
and proprioceptive awareness. 
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that allows me to perceive it and to move through it. We use the body, but 
we rarely reflect upon it. In painful and learning situations, the body appears 
at the core of our interest, but when we walk in the street, we are never 
aware of the precise position of our legs, and even less of our internal 
viscera state. This bodily absence could even explain Cartesian dualism 
(Leder, 1990): the prima facie fact is the res cogitans and not the res extensa 
of the body as the latter is less salient.  
In summary, on the one hand, the body is not an object among others 
that could leave me or disappear; but on the other hand, even if all actions 
depend on it, it is rarely the focus of attention. Therefore, the question is to 
understand the cognitive organization that underlies this paradox pointed out 
by Leder. But is this really a paradox? We can avoid the contradiction if we 
assume that we are talking of body representations at different cognitive 
levels. The question is thus to determine which levels. Rather than a 
dichotomy between conscious and unconscious states, James and Gurwitsch 
introduced a distinction within the field of consciousness itself between core 
and fringe states. In this latter sense, we are always aware of our body. 
However, as we will see later, this awareness does not extend to all bodily 
states. 
 
II. The Structure of Consciousness 
 
William James and Aron Gurwitsch emphasized the permanence of the 
feeling of bodily presence, but acknowledged that the body usually stays in 
the background of consciousness. There is no paradox here because of the 
organization of consciousness itself. William James challenged the 
Empiricist view according to which the field of consciousness should be 
conceived as chaos of experiences and claimed that conscious experiences 
are articulated into the focus and the margin. However, the organization 
stays extrinsic to the stream itself
2
 and there is no distinction inside the 
margin itself: when I am reading a paper, the general knowledge that I have 
about its topic and my eye movements are put on the same level. Gurwitsch 
(1964) challenged this view and postulated an immanent organization of the 
field of consciousness articulated by the intrinsic relation of relevancy 
between the material content of the theme and some co-present data. He 
claimed the existence of three (and not two) dimensions: the theme upon 
which the mental activities concentrate, the thematic field or context that is 
relevant to the theme, and the margin, which is co-present with the theme 
but irrelevant to it. Inside the margin, he also made a distinction between the 
halo that is externally related to the theme, for instance reflective thoughts, 
and the horizon that is only co-present with the theme. He used the 
metaphor of a circle. The theme constitutes the center of the circle, the 
                                                 
2
 Experiences are related by mutual compenetration and fringe states are integrated 
within each focus state, although varying in attentiveness. Thus, the organization is 
not intrinsic in the structure of consciousness and there is no real disconnection 
between the two kinds of states. 
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thematic field is inside the circumference and the margin lies beyond the 
circumference. In summary, we can describe the structure of consciousness 
as below: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This schema does not exhaust the difference between James and 
Gurwitsch. The latter asserted that the margin is completely disconnected 
from the thematic field. In this sense, the marginal content of consciousness 
is contingent, because it does not need to respect any semantic constraint. 
This structure supposes that all the components of the field of consciousness 
are not experienced as equivalent, because otherwise we would not be able 
to order them and to choose one of them in order to behave appropriately. 
Three closely related factors intervene in the articulation of the field of 
consciousness:  
 
- procedural factor: attention  
- qualitative factor: intensity 
- semantic factor: relevancy  
 
These factors are not mutually derivable, although they may be related. 
Attention can be driven by the subject‘s deliberate decision (endogenous 
attention), but also by the saliency of stimuli, like their intensity (exogenous 
attention). For instance, a great pain will probably constitute the conscious 
theme, while if it hurts only weakly, it will stay at the margin. However, the 
most interesting feature of Gurwitsch‘s conception is the semantic factor.3 
Roughly, a state belongs to the thematic field if it is relevant to the theme, 
                                                 
3 By semantic, I do not mean that we should understand the field of consciousness in 
linguistic terms or that all conscious states are propositional. Rather, I emphasize the 
importance of the content of the states, i.e., the intentional objects (or the noemata) 
of the states. 
Fig. 1 The structure of consciousness 
The field of consciousness 
Theme Margin 
Thematic field Margin 
JAMES‘S THEORY 
GURWITSCH‘S THEORY 
Halo Horizon 
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that is, if its content stands in a certain relationship with it. However, as we 
will see, the precise nature of this relation is not so easily defined. 
In summary, marginal consciousness is contingent, irrelevant, and 
disconnected from the thematic field. We do not pay attention to it and it is 
dimly felt. Nevertheless, it allows us to always be aware of reality. At any 
moment, we can be conscious of three domains of reality, at least at the 
margin: (1) the stream of consciousness itself; (2) the perceptual 
environment; (3) the bodily presence. 
I will focus here only on this latter aspect. Even if we do not pay 
attention to our own body, it is still present at the margin. In this sense, there 
is no more paradox because the absence at the center of the circle can co-
exist with a presence outside its circumference. The consequence of the 
described structure of consciousness is that we are always conscious of our 
body: ―There is no moment in our conscious life when we are completely 
unaware of our bodily posture, of the fact that we are walking, standing, 
sitting, lying down.‖ (Gurwitsch, 1985: 31) 
Therefore, Gurwitsch‘s theory of body consciousness is articulated into 
two related assumptions: The irrelevancy hypothesis by which body 
consciousness is most of time marginal and irrelevant to the thematic field 
and The conscious hypothesis by which we are always conscious of our 
body. 
Each of these hypotheses raises several questions. The first one implies 
that marginal body consciousness should never affect the theme. Thus, one 
should be as if she was disembodied at the level of the thematic activity. 
However, empirical results seem to argue against this disconnection: the 
body does always interfere. The second hypothesis also requires some 
clarification. Gurwitsch did not describe the specific content of the marginal 
consciousness of the body and we can wonder about its nature and its 
precision. Once these questions elucidated, we will be able to sketch the 
different levels of body consciousness and their relations.  
 
 
III. The Irrelevancy Hypothesis 
 
According to Gurwitsch, marginal data are by definition irrelevant to 
the thematic field. He provided several illustrations and descriptions of the 
notion of relevancy, but as far as I know, he has never explicitly given any 
operational definition that allows one to decide when data are relevant for 
the theme. 
 
   When we choose a geometrical figure as our theme, the 
mode of appearance of the figure varies according to 
whether the figure is presented on for example, a red or a 
yellow ground, whether the figure is surrounded by other 
figures, whether the surrounding figures or all of the same 
or of different kinds and so on. (Gurwitsch, 1964: 137) 
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   The passage [of music] under discussion refers to those 
preceding. It stands in definite and specific musical 
relations to those other passages and derives its musical 
perspective from such relation. (idem, 137) 
 
   Absorbed in a scientific topic, e.g., a mathematical 
problem, we may think of a friend whose visit is 
anticipated during the course of the day. Disregarding the 
eventuality of our being distracted from our theme by the 
intruding thought, we have nothing more than two acts 
experienced simultaneously. If the anticipation of our 
friend‘s visit appears as a disturbing intrusion, this is 
because between the anticipated visit and the scientific 
topic engrossing our mind, merely the relation of 
simultaneous occurrence without any intrinsic relationship 
exists. (idem, 282-283) 
 
   It may well be that, as James asserts, a closing of the 
glottis and an interruption of the breath are experienced, 
either regularly or occasionally, when we are confronted 
with a theoretical problem for which we do not see a 
solution … However, this bodily condition pertains in no 
sense whatever to the problem situation with which we are 
confronted and no change in our bodily condition affects 
the problem situation. No feature, tinge or aspect of the 
theme … derives from the actual bodily condition or is 
modified by an alteration of this condition. (Gurwitsch, 
1985: 29) 
  
   Besides being co-present with the theme, the data falling 
under the first class [the thematic field] appear, moreover, 
as being of a certain concern to the theme. They have 
something to do with it, they are relevant to it. Here the 
relationship is not merely that of simultaneity in 
phenomenal time, but is founded upon the material 
contents of both the theme and the co-present data. Such a 
relationship is intrinsic. (Gurwitsch, 1964: 340)
4
 
 
What could we conclude? First, we need to understand that the mere 
phenomenal co-presence is not a sufficient condition of relevancy. Two 
simultaneous experiences are only related extrinsically by the phenomenal 
time, whatever content they have. On the contrary, the relation of relevancy 
is intrinsic, based on the specific contents of the related states. Secondly, the 
                                                 
4 Gurwitsch also qualified the relation of relevancy as a relation of ―pertinence‖ 
(idem, 332), or of ―affinity‖ (idem, 353), while irrelevant data were considered as 
―accessory, indifferent‖ (idem, 341). 
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relevant data interfere with the theme, modifying its visual mode of 
appearance or its musical perspective for instance. In other words, the theme 
would not be the same without the thematic field or with another thematic 
field. On the contrary, the marginal data do not affect the theme at all and 
seem to be completely disconnected from it. 
Consequently, I suggest two possible conditions of the relation of 
relevancy. An experience A is relevant to the theme B: (i) If A belongs to 
the semantic network of B
5
 and (ii) If A can affect the semantic content of 
B.
6
  
For instance, if I am thinking about my family in France, then the 
memory of my last meeting with them seems to be relevant in both senses. 
On the contrary, the feeling that my legs are crossed appears as totally 
irrelevant. We can notice that the relation of relevancy is not reciprocal: A 
may affect B, without B affecting A. However, this definition of relevancy 
is far too wide. The notion of semantic network is unclear. Roughly, the 
semantic network of B includes all the states that have the same class of 
meaning. More precisely, following Embree (2003), we can distinguish 
different species of relevancy: the perceptual relation between the figure and 
the background, the cultural relation between for instance one utensil and its 
practical situation, the logic relation between different propositions inside an 
argument, and also the ontological relation within one domain of 
experiences like the inner life, the body, and the perceptual environment. 
However, these distinctions are not fine-grained enough for strictly 
delimiting the thematic field. In Gurwitsch‘s mathematics example, we 
cannot assume that all the mathematical knowledge is relevant: geometrical 
principles are completely unrelated to the arithmetic problem that I have to 
solve. Therefore, the question is to determine how far we should extend the 
relevant semantic network of the theme.  
The second condition may help. As Gurwitsch said, ―no change in our 
bodily condition affects the problem situation.‖ In other words, bodily 
consciousness should not affect the thematic activity. I will assume that the 
relevant data are able to affect the theme only if they can cause its 
modification, in the same way as the background can alter the mode of 
appearance of the figure.
7
 Still, the second condition does not describe what 
should be considered as an effect. Furthermore, it is controversial, as 
Natsoulas (1996, 1997) has pointed out. If I am attentively looking at an 
apple, then my body position affects my perception. He (1997) has 
emphasized this point by appealing to Gibson‘s conception of ecological 
vision: ―Oneself and one's body exist along with the environment, they are 
co-perceived.‖ (Gibson, 1979) 
                                                 
5 The thematic field is indeed defined as ―being of a certain concern to the theme.‖ 
6 The theme indeed ―varies according‖ or ―derives from‖ the relevant data and 
cannot be ―modified‖ or ―affected‖ by the marginal data.  
7 We may notice that Gurwitsch was more interested by the description than by the 
explanation. As Embree points out in the introduction of this volume, causation is 
not the primary concern for Gurwitsch. 
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Natsoulas referred to Gibson‘s notion of visual kinesthesis: each time I 
move, the patterns of the optical flow inform me that I am moving. Thus, 
the optical flow includes information about oneself as well as about the 
environment. However, this notion does not seem to be relevant in our 
discussion of Gurwitsch. Visual kinesthesis allows us to conclude that 
perceptual data are relevant to bodily data, but not the reverse. Nevertheless, 
Gibson also claimed that by perceiving my body, I perceive the world. Each 
perception is relative to one‘s own body position and state. I will provide 
three illustrations of this interaction between perception of the world and 
perception of the body. 
First, the integration of touch with body position information is 
especially important for stereognosis, the use of touch to judge the size and 
the shape of objects.
8
 Bermudez (1998) noticed that by touching an object in 
the night, the modification of the spatial properties of his fingers conveys 
new information about the spatial properties of the object. He concluded that 
proprioceptive consciousness is always at the periphery of tactile 
consciousness. Even if we do not pay attention to this proprioceptive 
consciousness, it still interferes with the tactile theme by allowing a better 
knowledge of the object.
9
 Moreover, the misperception of the bodily 
position causes illusions in stereognosis. For instance, Aristotle discovered 
that by holding a small ball between the crossed third and fourth fingers, 
you feel as if the ball had doubled. This doubling occurs because the tactile 
input is interpreted as if the fingers were not crossed (Graziano and 
Botvinick, 2000). 
Thus, the spatial organization of perceptual states is constructed by the 
subject through the interaction of visual, tactile, and kinesthetic inputs 
(Poincaré, 1905). For instance, vestibular information contributes to the 
conscious perception of orientation (Berthoz, 1997). Patients with lesions of 
the parieto-insular vestibular cortex—involved in the encoding of the 
movement of the head in space—see the world leaning the side opposite to 
the lesion. The effect of deviations of the vertical subjective is so strong that 
their photographs are skewed (Dieterich and Brandt, 1993).  
The neuroscience of vision emphasizes the importance of bodily 
information. We are not static in the world and the objects that we see often 
constitute goals for actions. Vision has two main functions: recognition and 
action. This functional distinction can be found at the anatomical level 
between the ventral visual pathway (infero-temporal) dedicated to the 
semantic process of the object and the dorsal visual pathway (infero-
parietal) dedicated to the interaction of the subject with the object (Milner 
                                                 
8 As Lester Embree has also told in the introduction, Gurwitsch recognized the 
possibility of synaesthesis and we may then assume that he would accept the 
possible effect of bodily experiences in the perception of objects.  
9 However, I agree with Gallagher (2003) that it is most probably proprioceptive 
information rather than proprioceptive awareness that is involved in stereognosis. As 
we will see later, the unconscious status of the bodily information explains how it 
can affect the theme without being part of the thematic process. 
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and Goodale, 1995). Vision for action computes visuo-motor 
transformations and encodes the relevant features for action into an 
egocentric frame of reference. These coordinates change through the action 
execution and always need to be updated. For instance, the position in space 
of the apple that you want to reach is transferred from an extrinsic (visual) 
into an intrinsic (proprioceptive) system of coordinates (Jeannerod, 1997). 
The focus of your attention is the apple that you see, still bodily information 
is necessary. Similarly, when you play tennis, you pay attention to the ball 
and not to your body (except if you are learning to play), but you will never 
be able to hit the ball if you do not compute its position in respect with your 
body.  
We can provide two possible interpretations of these examples, which 
seem to challenge Gurwitsch‘s hypothesis of disconnection between the 
thematic field and the margin. We have just demonstrated that the 
representation of bodily properties makes a difference for the theme. Thus, 
we could conclude that in those cases, the consciousness of the body is not 
marginal, but belongs to the thematic field. This could be true in some cases 
but it cannot be true for all the phenomena described, because it would 
ultimately imply that most of the time the body is not at the margin of our 
consciousness, contrary to what Gurwitsch said. We are indeed always 
interacting with the world so that we always need to know the position and 
the state of our body. Except when these interactions are themselves 
marginally conscious, the body would always belong to the thematic field. 
In order to avoid such conclusion, we then may suggest that bodily 
consciousness stays at the margin because even if it fulfills the second 
condition, it does not satisfy the first one. For instance, my desire to eat the 
apple in front of me is not semantically related to the proprioceptive 
experience of my arm moving. As Natsoulas (1997) said, even if body 
information affects the theme, it is not included in the thematic process. 
Similarly, Gurwitsch (1985: 29) concluded that bodily condition is not 
―integrated into the thematic process‖.  
We have just tried to investigate more deeply the notion of relevancy in 
order to understand how the bodily consciousness is only marginal, despite 
the almost constant interference of bodily information with the theme. The 
combination between the first condition of the semantic relation and the 
second condition of the effect relation seems to be able to restraint the 
extension of the notion of relevancy. However, as Gurwitsch (1964) 
acknowledged himself, the frontier of the thematic field remains 
indeterminate: 
 
Not only does the thematic field admit indistinctness and 
indeterminateness, but, as previously mentioned, 
vagueness, and indetermination usually prevail in the 
more remote zones of the thematic field. A given theme 
points and refers not only to the ‗adjoining‘ parts of the 
thematic field, that is, objects, facts, data, and items of 
immediate concern to it, but also to more remote zones 
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having comparatively little bearing upon the theme, and 
even beyond to items fusing with one another into an 
inarticulate mass. Such a mass has hardly a direct, if any, 
concern to the theme. Still, that fused and confused mass 
is referred to as somehow relevant to the theme, at least in 
that its indistinct and indiscriminate components having 
―something to do‖ with the theme or are of the same kind 
and nature … Properly speaking, the experience of 
relevancy has here the sense of indefinite continuation 
rather than continuity of context. (Gurwitsch, 1964: 378-
380) 
 
Thus, we can still wonder whether the bodily data do not belong to the 
most remote zone of the thematic field. One way to avoid this conclusion is 
to suggest that they do not even belong to the field of consciousness. In the 
next part, we will see the conditions under which body information can have 
―something to do‖ with the theme without being part of the thematic field.  
 
 
IV. The Consciousness Hypothesis 
 
   Our own bodily position, attitude, condition, is one of 
the things of which some awareness, however inattentive, 
invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else 
we know. We think, and as we think, we feel our bodily 
selves as the seat of our thinking. (James, 1890: 242) 
 
   We are immediately and directly aware of our body, at 
least in marginal form, at every moment of our lives, 
under all circumstances, and at whatever place we might 
happen to find ourselves. Again, the body is the only 
individual mundane object which is thus permanently 
present. (Gurwitsch, 1985: 60) 
 
James and Gurwitsch claimed that we are always aware of our body. I 
do not want to challenge this view, but rather to investigate the content of 
the continuous marginal body consciousness. Do I feel the presence of my 
body (―I have a body‖) or its state (―I am sitting‖)? It is right that we feel 
embodied, except in some depersonalization disorders where people have a 
sensation of dissociation from their own body. For instance, they may feel 
as if they were dead (Simeon et al., 2000) or floating above their own body 
(Grotstein, 1983). Descartes also doubted the reality of his own body: 
nothing assured him that he had a body, that he was not dreaming or 
hallucinating its existence. More recently, Putnam (1981) suggested that we 
could be disembodied brains in a vat and that the experience of our own 
body would be the result of electric impulses from a computer. 
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Nevertheless, neither Descartes nor Putnam refuted the fact that we have 
bodily feelings, they only tried to challenge the fact that there is any 
objective body beyond these feelings and even in this respect, they both 
refuted skepticism.  
However, Gurwitsch went further and claimed that we are not only 
aware that we have a body, we are also aware of its position and its state. It 
does not mean that the content of body consciousness at the margin is as 
detailed as it would be if it were the focus of our attention. On the contrary, 
the marginal awareness is ―dim, vague, indistinct, and indeterminate‖ 
(Gurwitsch, 1985: 27) and constitutes ―merely the indiscriminate and 
obscure horizon, devoid of inner structure and articulation‖ (idem, 35). The 
bodily experiences are only co-present at the margin and they can be 
integrated into a consistent representation of the body only at the level of the 
thematic field. However, are we conscious of the body in all its details or 
only as a unitary whole without any internal differentiation?  
O‘Shaughnessy (1980, 1995) raised the same question. In 1980, he 
argued that we should be conscious of all the points of the body at any 
moment. He noticed that we are able to realize whatever action whenever 
we want without having to think about the position of our limbs. This 
continuous flow of information that we use should therefore always stay at 
the margin of consciousness. However, he acknowledged in 1995 that his 
theory was not parsimonious and did not fit well with reality. We 
consciously perceive our body as an undifferentiated whole and actions 
automatically trigger a precise perception of the limbs involved, while the 
other parts of the body recede in the awareness. Thus, proprioceptive 
consciousness would be similar to peripheral visual perception (Kinsbourne, 
1995): visual information at the periphery of the retina is less specific, as 
there are fewer photoreceptors; similarly, the content of marginal 
proprioceptive representations is less fine-grained (I am conscious that my 
arm is flexed, but not of its precise angle).  
Several experimental data show that we are weakly conscious of our 
body position, even at the margin. Most of our actions are automatic and we 
have a limited awareness of motor and body representations. For instance, 
Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) asked subjects to trace sagittal lines on a 
graphic tablet while they were given visual feedback projected from a 
computer screen on a mirror. In normal trials, the line seen in the mirror 
exactly matched the traced lines. In perturbed trials, a bias was introduced 
and subjects consistently displaced their hand in order to compensate the 
bias. After each trial, they were asked in which direction they thought their 
hand had moved. They showed poor consciousness of the signals generated 
by their own movements and they tended to adhere to visual rather than to 
proprioceptive representations. For instance, they reported the opposite 
direction of their actual movements (e.g., a bias of 15° to the left rather than 
to the right). Therefore, most of the time, we are conscious only of the 
general goal of the action and the visual feedback of the execution, but the 
specific parameters of the way we have accomplished the movement—that 
is, the succession of body positions—are unavailable to awareness, even at 
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the margin. We need thus to make a distinction between on the one hand the 
body representations used for action control that are fine-grained, but that 
are not available to consciousness and on the other hand, the body 
representations that are conscious, but not necessarily accurate, nor 
detailed.
10
  
Gurwitsch provided a conceptual framework for understanding the 
status of the body in respect to consciousness. However, we have just seen 
that we also need to take into account the status of the body outside the 
sphere of consciousness. The metaphor of the circle is no longer appropriate 
because it implies that there is nothing beyond marginal consciousness, as it 
seems to include all that lie outside the circumference. Thus, there seems to 
be no room for unconscious bodily representations. Nevertheless, the 
experimental data show that we need to postulate another dimension beyond 
the circle, that is, unconscious body representations. We should not 
assimilate perception, attention, and consciousness. The body is represented 
on the basis of the continuous flow of sensory information, prior to any 
thematization in the conscious field. Even at the unconscious level, we 
consider the body as being mentally represented.
11
 
The question is then to understand why sometimes bodily 
representations become conscious. It raises the problem of the relation 
between attention and consciousness: is attention a necessary condition for 
consciousness or can we only pay attention to what is already conscious? 
This question is all the more difficult that psychological literature often 
confuses both notions. Moreover, it goes far beyond the body domain. 
Gurwitsch focused on the attentional process that occurs in the field of 
consciousness itself. However, we should not preclude the prior existence of 
automatic attentional selectivity. Attention intervenes at different stages in 
the process of information, and more particularly, we should distinguish 
between the voluntary and selective attention and the low-level process of 
attentional filter. Various experimental results show that attention may even 
be a prerequisite of consciousness (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). 
Conditions of stimulation by themselves, such as duration and clarity, do not 
suffice to elicit consciousness. For instance, people with right parietal 
lesions suffering from personal neglect explicitly deny the existence of the 
contralateral side of their body or forget it (e.g., they shave or make up only 
the right side of their face). Nevertheless, if you allow them to pay attention 
to the forgotten side, then they become conscious of it: when the two hands 
are crossed, such that the left hand was to the right of the trunk and 
conversely, the tactile extinction switches hands (Aglioti, Smania and Peru, 
1999). Moreover, objects that do not fall in an attended region of the visual 
                                                 
10 If action execution used only conscious body representations, it would not be 
reliable because they are not fine-grained enough to allow us to reach any object. 
11 The unconscious states cannot be reduced to a flow of neural activity. They are 
properly mental and they do indeed far more than simply pool the sensory 
information. Rather, they integrate the sensory inputs from different modalities into a 
meaningful representation by establishing new relationships between them. 
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field cannot be consciously reported, as it is shown by the phenomenon of 
inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998). The subject is required to 
perform a visual discrimination task at a specific location of his visual field, 
while another visual stimulus appears at different locations. The conditions 
of stimulation should suffice to elicit consciousness, and yet a large 
percentage of subjects failed to report the presence of the rival stimulus. In 
other words, body representations cannot be conscious if the subject does 
not pay any attention to them.  
Therefore, we need to improve the metaphor of the circle in order to 
integrate unconscious representations of the bodily and at least two levels of 
attention:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can now reply to the problem raised by the irrelevancy hypothesis, 
that is, to the fact that some body information affects the thematic 
consciousness. The role played by body information in action monitoring 
does not imply that representations of bodily position are included in the 
thematic process, because they are not available to awareness, marginally or 
not. Actually, as we have already said, the content of marginal body 
consciousness is too coarse-grained for action monitoring. Therefore, we 
can maintain the disconnection hypothesis between thematic and marginal 
consciousness. The nature of unconscious representations of the body and 
their relations to the thematic process are another question.  
Fig. 2 Perception, Attention and Consciousness 
High-level attention  
Low-level attention 
Thematic consciousness 
Unconscious body 
representations 
Marginal consciousness 
SOMATO-SENSORY INFORMATION 
I‘m sitting. 
I stretch my 
arm with an 
angle x  
I have a 
headache. 
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V. Body schema and body image 
 
Let us imagine that I am attending to a very interesting conference 
about Gurwitsch. When I enter into the room, I have a brief look at myself 
in the mirror: I consciously represent my body, mainly based on visual 
information, I think that I have shadows under my eyes and feel sorry about 
it. Then, I take a seat and listen carefully to the philosopher who is talking. 
Yet, I dimly experience that I have a body, which is complete and which 
belongs to me, and that I am sitting. During the talk, my pen falls and I bend 
down in order to grasp it. The sensori-motor system encodes the position of 
the pen relative to my body and monitors my movements in order to catch it.  
Thus, far from being marginal the body constantly intervenes in our life 
involving different kinds of representation that vary in respect with several 
dimensions. We may summarize this example as below: 
 
 Consciousness Specification Dynamics 
Looking at 
myself in the 
mirror 
Thematically 
conscious 
More or less 
detailed 
Long-term and 
short-term 
representations 
Focusing on the 
topic of the 
conference 
Marginally 
conscious 
Body as a whole Long-term and 
short-term 
representations 
Grasping the 
pen 
Unconscious Very accurate Short-term 
representations 
 
 
 
Head and Holmes (1911) suggested the existence of three kinds of body 
representation: the body schema, which reflects the modifications of 
position that are not yet conscious; the superficial schema, which is a central 
map of somatotopic tactile information; the body image, which is a 
plurimodal conscious representation of the body. I thus suggest to look for 
the function of each of these representations.  
As we have already seen, Milner and Goodale (1995) distinguished 
vision for recognition (―What‖) and vision for action (―How‖). Similarly, 
we can distinguish between the body schema and the body image 
(Gallagher, 1995). This functional distinction could also be applied to the 
representations of the body. Some neuropsychological results indeed show a 
double dissociation between patients with ―numbsense‖ who cannot identify 
their body parts while they are still able to point them with their hand and 
deafferented patients who recognize them without being able to reach them 
(Paillard, 1999). Therefore, body representations differ with respect to the 
semantic or pragmatic nature of their purpose. In this sense, the body image 
replies to question ―What‖ (What is this body part? What are the position 
and the state of my body?), while the body schema replies to the question 
―How‖ (how to use my body?). Body schema allows us to walk, to grasp a 
Fig. 3 Reflexive body, Marginal body and Unconscious body 
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glass or to catch a ball, while body image is oriented toward the semantic 
recognition of the body.
12
 From this functional difference, follow several 
distinct features of these representations that I will briefly describe.  
The body schema is a dynamic sensori-motor representation based on 
the continuous flow of somesthesic and visual information. If you want to 
move, you need indeed to know very quickly the position of your limbs at 
every moment. According to Libet et al. (1991), only cerebral activity that 
lasts more than 500 ms is able to elicit awareness. Therefore, as a short-term 
representation involved in action monitoring, body schema is not available 
to consciousness. On the contrary, body image involves long-term conscious 
representations that include perceptual, conceptual, and emotional 
components. It relies on different conceptions of the body
13
: 
 
- ―the innate body‖: innate internal model of the body at the origin of 
the phenomenon of phantom limb in aplasic patients (Melzack, 
1990) 
- ―the usual body‖: representation of the body stored in long-term 
memory 
- ―the actual body‖: visuo-spatial representation of the body 
- ―the semantic body‖: conceptual and linguistic representation of 
the body 
- ―the cultural body‖: social representation of the body and its 
evaluation by a specific culture 
 
We can become aware of each of these body images. However, when 
they are only at the margin of the field of consciousness, they are less 
organized and articulated and we can have access to full-content body 
images only if we introspectively pay attention to our body.  
Despite their differences, the body image and the body schema are 
intimately related. The body image does indeed structure the body schema, 
while it is itself partly the result of the representation common to the 
successive body schemata (O‘Shaughnessy, 1995). However, it does not 
follow that the body image is only the part of the body schema that becomes 
available to awareness through the filter of attention. Their content and their 
functions are clearly distinct and should not be confused.  
                                                 
12 It may play a role for action, but only when it requires having a conscious and 
reflective behavior, like in motor training (Gallagher and Cole, 1995). 
13 The distinction between the usual and the actual body is made by Merleau-Ponty 
(1945). 
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Conclusion 
 
The body can be apprehended both as a point of view on the world and 
as an object within this world. The thematic consciousness, based on 
perceptual, conceptual, and emotional body images, emphasizes this latter 
aspect. However, we scarcely focus on our body because we are more 
involved in the external world than in ourselves. Nevertheless, we cannot 
have any interaction with mundane objects if we do not take into account 
the body itself. The implication of the body does not need to be conscious, 
and even our efficiency depends on the unconsciousness of sensori-motor 
body representations. Thus, the body schema expresses the body as an agent 
in its continuous relation with the world. Yet, the question of body 
representations cannot be settled by this dichotomization between conscious 
and unconscious processes, between object and subject. In-between these 
two levels, the marginal body consciousness plays its own role. Like the 
body schema, it is continuously present, always in the background of 
consciousness. Like the body image, it represents the body as a whole and 
does not intervene in action monitoring. Marginal bodily consciousness 
manifests the feeling that my point of view on the world is always anchored 
in this body that belongs to me.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conscious body image 
 
 Thematic consciousness 
Marginal consciousness 
Unconscious sensorimotor 
body schema  
Low-level attention 
High-level attention  
SOMATO-SENSORY INFORMATION 
Fig. 4 Body representations 
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